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then added that to permit the possibility of tax avoidance
through recognition of losses to control the construction of the
limitation of gain provision would be to overrule the apparent
judgment of Congress on this question. 1
Although the adoption of the rationale of the instant case
might well result in the conversion of what would otherwise be
legitimate reorganizations into transactions in which losses
would be currently recognizable, it would seem that the legisla-
tive history soundly supports the instant decision. If Congress
has constructed this provision in such a manner as to permit its
abuse, the correction should be made by the Congress, not by
judicial fiat.
Martin Smith, Jr.
INSURANCE- AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE- "TEMPORARY
SUBSTITUTE" PROVISION- WITHDRAWN FROM NORMAL USE
Plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from an ac-
cident in which defendant's insured was involved. Defendant
had issued a liability policy on a family car which was registered
and insured in the wife's name. At the time of the accident the
husband was driving the son's car, because the poor condition
of the tires on the family car rendered its use on long trips
hazardous. Despite the condition of the tires on the family car,
the wife and son continued to use it to go a short distance to
and from work. The insurer contended that the family policy
issued to the wife did not provide coverage for the accident since
the family car had not been withdrawn from normal use as
required by the temporary substitute provision. The court of
appeal held for the plaintiff, finding that the family car had
been withdrawn from regular, normal use and that the son's
automobile was a temporary substitute automobile covered by
the policy issued on the family car. On appeal to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, held, reversed, two Justices dissenting. The
son's car was not a temporary substitute automobile because
the insured's automobile had not been withdrawn from normal
use as required by that provision.' Fullilove v. United States
Casualty Co., 125 So.2d 389 (La. 1960).
31. Id. at 675.
1. It appears that the opinion did not consider the question of breakdown to
any appreciable extent. Before considering the question of withdrawal from
normal use the court stated: "[T]ires being necessary to the operation of the
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The guiding principle of the family automobile policy "is to
cover virtually every risk contingency which might reasonably
occur in a family's use of automobiles."' 2 In general, the policy
attempts to provide protection for the insured against liability
growing out of the use of an automobile without regard to the
particular automobile being used at the time when liability
attaches. At the same time certain limitations are imposed for
the purpose of enabling the insurer to set premiums which will
not make the cost of such a policy prohibitive.3 Broadening of
coverage, while maintaining reasonable premiums, has been ac-
complished through such provisions as the "non-owned automo-
bile," "owned automobile," and "temporary substitution" provi-
sions.
4
A non-owned automobile as defined by most policies means
an automobile not owned by or furnished for the regular use of
either the named insured or any relative, other than a temporary
substitute automobile.5 The non-owned provision provides cov-
erage not only for the named insured but also for a relative who
resides in the household of the insured who has the insured's
permission to use the car. Apparently the restriction applicable
to the automobile owned by a relative residing in the household
was inserted in the non-owned automobile definition to prevent
relatives who reside together from buying only one policy and
obtaining coverage for both cars. 6 Absent such an exclusion, the
named insured could purchase one policy covering the family car
and then use only the car owned by a relative while the relative
used only the named insured's automobile. The named insured's
automobile, 'breakdown' occurs when the condition of the tires are such that the
automobile is immobilized or unfit for normal use." Fullilove v. United States
Casualty Co., 125 So.2d 389, 392 (La. 1960).
2. Derrickson, The Family Automobile Policy, 18 CASUALTY & SURETY J. 45
(1957).
3. Lloyds America v. Ferguson, 116 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Central Nat.
Ins. Co. v. Sisneros, 173 F. Supp. 757 (D. N.M. 1959) ; Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Roberts, 156 Cal. App.2d 755, 320 P.2d 90 (1958) ; 5A AM. Jua., Automobile
Insurance § 87 (1956).
4. See Derrickson, The Family Automobile Policy, 18 CASUALTY & SURETY
J. 45 (1957) ; Parcher, The New Family Automobile Policy, 24 INS. COUNSEL
J. 13 (1957).
5. A relative is defined as a relative of the named insured who is a resident
of the same household. Persons insured with respect to a non-owned automobile
include: (1) the named insured, and (2) any relative, but only with respect to a
private passenger automobile or trailer, provided the actual use thereof is with
the permission of the owner.
6. Ibid. See American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co.,
258 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. App. 1953) ; Utilities Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 207 Okla. 574, 251
P.2d 175 (1952).
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policy would then cover both members of the household for a
premium rate applicable to a single vehicle.7
Although the insured is generally not protected when he is
driving the car of a relative living in the same household, he is
protected if the relative's automobile is a temporary substitute
vehicle as defined in the policy.8 A temporary substitute vehicle
is one that has been substituted for the insured's vehicle when
it has been withdrawn from normal use because of breakdown,
repair, servicing, loss, or destructionY
Under the temporary substitute provision, the temporary
requirement has been held to be satisfied by a finding that the
use of another automobile was not intended to be permanent.10
Some courts have held that in order for this provision to be
applicable the automobile borrowed by the insured must be in
fact substituted for the insured vehicle." Under these cases,
7. Absent this provision the named insured would be protected under the non-
owned provision and the relative would also receive the benefit of the named
insured's policy as a permittee of the named insured driving the named insured's
automobile. See Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Heflin, 137 F. Supp. 520
(W.D. Ark. 1956) ; Utilities Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 207 Okla. 574, 251 P.2d 175
(1952) ;Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 936, 950 (1954).
8. A temporary substitute automobile is defined in most policies as any auto-
mobile or trailer, not owned by the named insured, while temporarily used as a
substitute for the owned automobile or trailer when withdrawn from normal use
because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction. The named
insured includes the person named in the policy and his spouse, if a resident of
the same household.
Originally the family policy defined an owned automobile as a private pas-
senger, farm, or utility automobile or trailer owned by the named insured, and
included a temporary substitute automobile. Under this definition, any automobile
acquired by the named insured during the term of the policy was apparently
covered, even though no notice was given to the insurer. The only requirement
was that the named insured inform the company of the new acquisition during
the policy period. Derrickson, The Family Automobile Policy, 18 CASUALTY &
SURETY J. 45 (1957). This provision has been changed in virtually all policies to
require notification of acquisition of a second car within 30 days and to limit
coverage to automobiles described in the policy.
9. A temporary substitute automobile is included within the definition of an
owned automobile; this has the effect of extending coverage not only to the
named insured but to any person who has the permission of the named insured to
drive the car. See Davidson v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 165 N.Y.S.2d
598, 4 App. Div.2d 759 (1957), motion to vacate denied, 172 N.Y.S.2d 776, 5
App. Div.2d 878 (1957), aff'd, 181 N.Y.S.2d 510, 5 N.Y.2d 838, 155 N.E.2d 405
(1958), where the person using the insured vehicle with permission of the named
insured borrowed another automobile when the insured's vehicle became in-
operable. The court held that the temporary substitute provision did not extend
to an automobile borrowed without consent of the named insured. Accord, Grun-
deen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 238 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1956).
10. Fleckenstein v. Citizens' Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 591, 40
N.W.2d 733 (1950) (use of a borrowed car for five months by an insured while
his car was being repaired was found to be temporary). See 5A Am. Jus., Auto-
mobile Insurance § 87 (1956).
11. In Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d 67, 69 (5th Cir.
1952), the court stated that the insured must prove not only that the "vehicle
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it must be shown that the insured vehicle would normally have
been used for the specific undertaking but for some condition
which necessitated the use of another vehicle.12 Other courts
have stated that a borrowed automobile will not be considered
a temporary substitute if it is found that the substitution was
merely a convenience,' 3 or was made because the borrowed ve-
hicle was more suited to the specific undertaking than the in-
sured vehicle. 4 One case has required that the insured be given
possession and control over the substitute automobile similar
to that he would have had over the disabled car.' 5
Much controversy has arisen over the interpretation of the
requirement that the automobile be withdrawn from normal use.
Possibly the earliest expression by a court in interpreting this
phrase is found in Erickson v. Genisot0 where the provision was
held to require withdrawal from all normal use.' 7 Most subse-
quent cases have adopted this interpretation.' Practically, it
appears that the determinative factor has been whether or not
an insured continued to make some use of the disabled vehicle.
Where such use is found, recovery has been denied.19 However,
had been withdrawn from service because of breakdown, but also that except for
this the insured car would have been in use at the time and in the circumstances
involved. Such showing is necessary to establish 'temporary use as a substitute',
i.e. a car put in place of another." Accord, State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.
v. Bass, 192 Tenn. 558, 241 S.W.2d 568 (1951).
12. E.g., Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.
1952).
13. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Addy, 132 Colo. 202, 286 P.2d 622 (1955)
Ransom v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 250 N.C. 60, 108 S.E.2d 22 (1959) ; State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bass, 192 Tenn. 558, 241 S.W.2d 568 (1951).
It would seem, however, that the above cases actually presented a problem of
withdrawal because of breakdown, servicing, repair, loss or destruction as required
by the terms of the policy and should have been disposed of on this ground rather
than a finding that the substituted vehicle was more convenient.
14. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bass, 192 Tenn. 558, 241 S.W.2d
568 (1951).
15. Tanner v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & F.M.C. Ins. Co., 226 F.2d 498
(6th Cir. 1955).
16. 322 Mich. 303, 33 N.W.2d 803 (1948).
17. Id. at 304, 33 N.W.2d at 804: "[W]ithdrawal of the truck from normal
use, necessitated its withdrawal from all normal use."
18. Service Mutual Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 289 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956). See Ransom v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 250 N.C. 60, 108 S.E.2d 22
(1959); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bass, 192 Tenn. 558, 241
S.W.2d 568 (1951). Contra, Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398,
400 (Okla. App. 1959): "Under the reasonable and liberal interpretation that
must be given the 'temporary substitute automobile' provision, its wording does
not mean that the insured's own car, or the 'described automobile' must be disabled
from all use."
19. Erickson v. Genisot, 322 Mich. 303, 33 N.W.2d 803 (1948) ; Service Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 289 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
Recovery was also denied where the insured continued to use a borrowed car
for a period of ten days after the insured's automobile had been repaired and
returned to normal use. The court stated that the insured car must be withdrawn
excluding cases in which the substitution was purely a matter
of convenience, where the disabled vehicle was not driven during
the use of the borrowed vehicle, recovery has been allowed.2 0 In
the only reported case involving the substitution of an automo-
bile due to the bad tires of the insured vehicle, it was held that
the normal use of the insured vehicle encompassed out-of-town
use and that bad tires disabled the car for normal use.21 Although
in that case the disabled car was not in use at the time, the
insurer contended that the insured vehicle could have been used
and that therefore the substitute automobile should not be
counted as a temporary substitute automobile within the terms
of the policy. The court rejected this contention, saying that
such a distinction would overlook the important difference be-
tween normal use by the insured and "possible use by someone
other than the insured,"2 2 thus avoiding the problem of partial
withdrawal.
The instant case is the first Louisiana decision considering
the interpretation of the "temporary substitution" provision.3
Although the court's decision is in accord with the interpreta-
tion afforded the temporary substitution provision in similar
cases in other jurisdictions in which the disabled car was driven
during the use of the borrowed car, it appears to be a depar-
ture from the general rule that insurance provisions are to
be liberally construed in favor of the insured.24 Since the term
used in the policy is "normal use" rather than simply "use,"
there must be a distinction between withdrawal from normal use
and withdrawal from use. A withdrawal from use would seem
to require withdrawal from any use, whereas a withdrawal from
normal use would necessarily presuppose some use of the vehicle
i
at the time of the accident. Pennsylvania Threshermen & F.M.C. Ins. Co. v.
Robertson, 259 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1958).
20. Central National Ins. Co. v. Sisneros, 173 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.M. 1959)
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 156 Cal. App.2d 755, 320 P.2d 90 (1958) ; Flecken-
stein v. Citizens' Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 591, 40 N.W.2d 733 (1950) ;
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398 (Okla App. 1959) ; Lewis v.
Bradley, 7 Wis.2d 586, 97 N.W.2d 408 (1959).
21. Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398 (Okla. App. 1959).
The court did not decide or make mention of whether bad tires constituted a
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction as required by the policy.
22. Id. at 401.
23. In the instant case the son and the named insured were residents of the
same household. Therefore, a consideration of the temporary substitute provision
was necessitated because coverage was not available under the non-owned pro-
vision since the policy definition of a non-owned automobile excludes an automobile
owned by a relative residing in thle same household.
24. This criticism was made by Justice Sanders in dissent. Fullilove v. United
States Casualty Co., 125 So.2d 389, 397 (La. 1960). See authorities cited therein.
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short of the way in which it was normally used. In other words
a partial withdrawal of the automobile from the use to which it
was normally put would seem to be a withdrawal from normal
use. Therefore it would seem that this term must refer to a
partial rather than a total withdrawal from use. As stated pre-
viously, in general, the policy purports to provide protection for
the insured against liability growing out of the use of an auto-
mobile without regard to the particular automobile being used.
To this certain exceptions are provided in order to prevent the
cost of premiums from becoming prohibitive or any attempt by
the insured to provide coverage with respect to more than one
automobile while paying a premium rate applicable to a single
car. Recognizing, however, that insureds may, on occasion, need
to use such a relative's car when the insured's own vehicle is
not functioning properly, the family policy provides coverage
for the insured in such situations under the temporary substitute
provision. If this appraisal of the intent of the policy is correct,
it would seem that the proper solution to the problem of partial
withdrawal would depend in each case upon a determination of
whether or not the use of the substitute is temporary in nature
and is traceable to the breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or
destruction of the automobile described in the policy. If so, then
he ought to be covered by his policy which basically purports to
"cover virtually every risk contingency which might reasonably
occur" and the circumstances of each case are a sufficient guard
against any attempt to avoid the payment of two premiums.
If the proposition that coverage should not be denied simply
because of the limited use of the insured's automobile is ac-
cepted, the only remaining question would be whether or not
the condition of the automobile described in the policy which
resulted in the partial withdrawal was due to breakdown, repair,
servicing, loss, or destruction. 25 Thus it would seem that if re-
covery is to be denied in cases involving substitution due to
bad tires, it should be done on the ground that bad tires do not
constitute a breakdown and not on the theory that the words
"normal use" require withdrawal from "all normal use. '26 Fur-
25. In neither reported case involving bad tires did the court squarely face
the issue of breakdown. In Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398
(Okla. App. 1959), recovery was allowed without mention of this requirement
and in the instant case the court seems to assume that this constituted a break-
down.
26. The insurer's objection to multiple coverage resulting if protection is af-
forded when the insured's disabled automobile is not totally withdrawn from use
would not seem to merit serious consideration in light of the fact that in other
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ther it would seem that in most cases it would be to the in-
surer's benefit to allow the insured to use a substitute auto-
mobile when his own car becomes dangerous to drive as long as
it is clear that the named insured, by using the other car, is not
trying to avoid the payment of two premiums.
Gerald L. Walter, Jr.
LABOR LAW - SECONDARY PRODUCTS PICKETING UNDER THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
In furtherance of its dispute with a manufacturing company,
the respondent union picketed retail stores selling the company's
products. The signs, which appealed to the consuming public not
to buy the disputed products, were carried by one picket at con-
sumer entrances of each retail establishment. Picketing began
after employees of the retail stores reported for work and ceased
before they normally left for the day. Although some employees
used the consumer entrances during the day and could see the
picketing from inside the stores and although many deliveries
were made through these entrances, no retail employees refused
to work or handle products and no deliveries were interfered
with. Acting upon charges filed by the retailers, the National
Labor Relations Board held that this picketing constituted an
unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (B) (i) and
(ii) of the Labor Management Relations Act as amended in 1959
because it induced and encouraged secondary employees to strike
or refuse to perform services and restrained and coerced owners
of the retail stores to cease doing business with another person.
Wholesale and Warehouse Employees, Local 261 (Perfection,
Mattress & Spring Co.), 129 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (Dec. 31, 1960).
A secondary boycott in labor law can generally be defined as
the bringing of economic pressure against a person not involved
in a labor dispute for the purpose of increasing pressure on a
party involved in the dispute.' A type of secondary boycott is
situations the policy clearly contemplates such a result. For example, where a
family policy is issued to Mr. or Mrs. A, and Mr. A gives his son permission to
use the family car while Mr. A uses a car borrowed from X, and Mrs. A uses a
car borrowed from Y, the policy covers the use of all three automobiles. Mr. and
Mrs. A are both named insureds and are therefore protected under the non-owned
provision and the son is protected under the owned automobile provision.
1. See Alpert v. Local 1066, International Longshoremen's Association, 166 F.
Supp. 22 (D.C. Mass. 1958). See also 105 CONG. REc. 3926-28 (1959) (remarks
of Rep. Lafore).
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